The Light Infantry Division: Cold War Chimera

The Cold War generally conjures up images of high intensity battlefields in Central Europe pitting the numerous motorized and tank divisions of the Warsaw Pact against the heavily outnumbered formations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although this scenario did not come to pass, for the U.S Army, the armored and mechanized defense of the German Fulda Gap was symbolic of this period. Yet, the American light infantry division was also a creature of the Cold War; one of the major organizational changes engineered by the U.S Army in the 1980s; and purportedly a component of this high intensity “Fulda Gap” defense of Central Europe against the hordes of the Warsaw Pact.

General John A. Wickham, Jr., Army Chief of Staff from 1983 to 1987, sponsored the development of the Light Infantry Division (LID) in the face of opposition from traditional Armor and heavy force officers. General Wickham wanted a light division that could deploy using expected airlift assets while allowing the U.S. Army to perform contingency missions at short notice. While contentious, this development seemingly allowed the Army to meet its twin strategic challenges of the 1980s: the provision of rapidly deployable light infantry force packages needed to defend U.S. interests worldwide and to reinforce the defense of Europe.iii Specifically the LID provided a more strategically deployable force, consisting of 10,483 officers and men that could deploy in 550 C-141 aircraft sorties, to address the increasing number of counter-insurgencies present in the 1980’s.Proponents also developed a variety of potential roles for it as part of the NATO’s deterrent defense…

With this background, this historical essay examines the perceived role of the light infantry division in the high-intensity conflict environment of the central European theater from the divisions’ inception in 1983 until the end of the Cold War in 1991. For sources, besides the policy and doctrinal documents available, it will use a rich reservoir of thesis papers and monographs from field grade officers attending the staff colleges during the 1980s and 90s, articles from military professional journals on the subject from 1983 onwards, and contemporary reports produced by various consultants, analysts, and military officers. Many of the military sources offer relevant insights from field grade and general officers with a deep understanding of how such light infantry units would actually operate on the battlefield according to training, doctrine, and enemy behavior.